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1 A cryptological schemes using the partition identities
1.1 A membership verification using partition identities
Suppose that r members want to keep their fortune in a bank. Approaching to
their fortune requires all member’s permission and it will be happened many
times. In the membership verification processes, they don’t believe the bank
employee’s decision whether each claimant is really one of the members and
don’t believe each other who claims his/her membership and worry about that
in the communication processes with the bank, informations they exchange may
leak.
We introduce a scheme for the membership verification using a kind of parti-
tion identities. In [2], Kim introduced some kind of partition number identities.
A feature of this identities is that although we change the base set(or the set of
parts)1, this identities always true. We introduce one of the identities briefly in
Section 2 and suggest cryptological schemes, can be used to r-person authenti-
cation and r-person secret ballot, using the identities in Section 3. The schemes
based on the difficulty of computing u, v from the values of pAα (u)p
A
α (v) for some
base sets A. For brief explanation, see the second chapter.
Here is a scheme for the membership verification.
Setting. For r members, They put a valuable in a safe and share the key.
Then they keep it in a safe-deposit box at a bank. Assume that the safe is really
safe.
Step 1. A bank employee chooses natural numbers n1, n2 and α such that
gcd(n1, α) = gcd(n2, α) = 1.
2 Then he/she computes the solution matrix
(a
nµ,α
ij ) for n1, n2 and α so that he/she gets the partition identity
pA(nµ) =
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
nµ,α
ij ).
Since the solution matrix (an,αij ) contains n, we do not want to reveal it. The
1It is a subset of the set of natural numbers. When we consider partitions on a base set(set
of parts), we only use elements of the base set.
2If α|n, the solution matrix contains a divisor of n.
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bank employee computes the product
(pA(n1)− p
A
α (n1))(p
A(n2)− p
A
α (n2))
and expend it. The expansion is composed of the sum of
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
n1,α
itj
)
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
n2,α
isj
).
We rewrite the expansion by
(pA(n1)− p
A
α (n1))(p
A(n2)− p
A
α (n2)) =
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (bij).
The bank employee keeps secret n1, n2 and the identities. He/She let the r-
members know α.
Step 2. The bank employee chooses some parts of terms of
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (bij)
so that any bij in a chosen term is far enough from 1 and n1, n2. The bank
employee properly distributes among the r members in the form of a product of
about half of original terms3 such as
∏K1
k=1 p
A
α (bi1jk) for the first member, · · · ,∏Kr
k=1 p
A
α (bi1jk) for the rth member
4. Note that it is impossible that restoring
n1, n2 by only a part of the identity. This process should be performed in safe
situation without any possibility of eavesdropping and the members should not
know each other’s terms.
Step 3. Every three years, The bank employee and the claimants chooses
randomly a large base set A∗. The bank employee computes
(pA
∗
(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2))
and the terms which hadn’t been distributed in the base set A∗. Each claimant
computes the combination of partition numbers, which they received, in the
base set A∗. Each claimant shares his/her result.
Step 4. The bank employee informs of the values of the undistributed
terms and the method to combine each claimant’s results with the values. The
claimants combines the partition numbers from the persons according to the
method. The bank employee informs of (pA
∗
(n1)−p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)−p
A∗
α (n2))
and the claimants informs of their final result. They check them.
3Revealing all term of a product can be helpful to compute n1 or n2. Revealing a single
partition number pAα (bij ) also should be avoided.
4More complicated form of distribution such as the bank employee gives an ordered pair
(
∏K1
k=1
pAα (bi1jk ),
∏K2
k=1
pAα (bi2jk ), · · · ,
∏Kt
k=1
pAα (bitjk )) for a member also possible as long as
any single term of distributed ordered pair is a product of at least two terms of identity and
preserving the original from i.e. a member receives a product pAα (u)p
A
α (v) if and only if there
exists i such that u, v ∈ {bij | j }.
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Step 5. Repeat Step 3 and Step 4 for several times.
Step 6. If the all tests for several base sets passed, The bank employee
opens the safe-deposit box. If they fail to the authentication process, The bank
employee reveals the values of distributed terms. The claimants find who’s
process was fail and expel him/her/them.
In Step 3 and Step 4, each claimant knows only (pA
∗
(n1)−p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)−
pA
∗
α (n2)) and the other’s results for several base sets so he/she can not com-
pute the other’s bij nor n1, n2. Therefore each claimant can not perform him-
self/herself nor make a person can perform as if he/she is a member except
a renouncement of his/her membership. An eavesdropper of this process can
not perform as if he/she is one of the member since the eavesdropper can not
know more information than a claimant. Therefore, in the situation that the
valuable, stored in a system which has same function with The bank employee
in the scheme, is an digital information and encrypted the member’s key, all
communications made in on-line, this scheme is safe from an eavesdropper or
fake claimant.
1.2 A scheme for a secret ballot
Let us think about a secret ballot in a community. The community have r
decision-makers who elected by all members of the community. There is also
an election commission for a secret ballot which does not contains a decision-
maker5. The election commission gives a suffrage to each decision-maker. In a
secret ballot, the members of the community want to know the number of ayes
and the number of nays, but it should not be known that who is the nay or the
aye except himself/herself.
In this situation, the scheme in Section 3.1 would be useful after some mod-
ification. Here is a scheme for a secret ballot.
Setting. For decision-makers of r members, the decision-makers meet in per-
son and does not reveal any information unless specifically noted. The election
commission does not contains a decision-maker and also does not reveal any
information unless specifically noted. The communication between the election
commission and the decision-makers is opened to the public. The number r of
the decision-makers is also known to the public.
Step 1. The election commission chooses natural numbers n1, n2 and α such
that gcd(n1, α) = gcd(n2, α) = 1.
6 Then he/she computes the solution matrix
(a
nµ,α
ij ) for n1, n2 and α so that he/she gets the partition identity
pA(nµ) =
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
nµ,α
ij ).
5In a representative democracy, for example, all citizens elect members of the National
Assembly. In the National Assembly, all members of the National Assembly elect the Chair-
man of the National Assembly(election commission for decision making) and a standing
committee(decision-makers). A bill should be passed a standing committee before the As-
sembly plenary session. The Chairman of the National Assembly can not participate in a
standing committee’s decision making.
6If α|n, the identity contains a divisor of n.
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Since the solution matrix (an,αij ) contains n, we do not want to reveal it. The
election commission computes the product
(pA(n1)− p
A
α (n1))(p
A(n2)− p
A
α (n2))
and expend it. The expansion is composed of the sum of
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
n1,α
itj
)
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
n2,α
isj
).
We rewrite the expansion by
(pA(n1)− p
A
α (n1))(p
A(n2)− p
A
α (n2)) =
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (bij).
The election commission keeps secret n1, n2 and the identities. He/She let the
public know α.
Step 2. The election commission chooses two sets
E := {i1, i2, · · · , ir, ir+1, ir+2, · · · , i2r}
and
B′ := {b′ij}
from B := {bij} where any b
′
kj in the products is far enough from 1 and n1, n2.
We define for k ∈ E,
v′k(A) :=
∏
j≥1
pAα (b
′
kj), b
′
kj ∈ B
′,
vk(A) :=
∏
j≥1
pAα (bkj), bkj ∈ B
′c
and for k ∈ Ec,
u′k(A) :=
∏
j≥1
pAα (b
′
kj), b
′
kj ∈ B
′,
uk(A) :=
∏
j≥1
pAα (bkj), bkj ∈ B
′c.
Note that
(pA(n1)− p
A
α (n1))(p
A(n2)− p
A
α (n2))
can be expressed by
∑
k∈E
v′k(A)vk(A) +
∑
k∈Ec
u′k(A)uk(A).
The election commission distributes among the r decision-makers such that the
sth decision-maker has two term7
v′is , v
′
ir+s
7The number of terms a decision-maker has can be grater by choosing the set E properly.
4
and opens
{u′k(A), | k ∈ E
c}
to the public.8 Note that it is impossible that restoring n1, n2 by u
′
k, v
′
k only a
part of the identity. This process should be performed in safe situation without
any possibility of eavesdropping and the decision-makers should not know each
other’s terms.
Step 3. In a secret ballot, the election commission and the decision-makers
chooses randomly a large base set A∗ so that the decision-maker’s own compu-
tation is not 0. If a decision-maker’s computation is 0, the decision-maker can
not express a disagreement with anonymity. They inform A∗ of the public. The
election commission computes
(pA
∗
(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2))
and two ordered pairs of natural numbers
(vis(A
∗), vir+s(A
∗))rs=1, (uk(A
∗))k∈Ec
and informs the public of the ordered pairs. Each decision-maker computes
Vs(A
∗) := v′is(A
∗)vis(A
∗) + v′ir+s(A
∗)vir+s(A
∗)
with the values, which are announced by the election commission, of the undis-
tributed terms. If a decision-maker wants to express his/her agreement, he/she
adds 1 to his/her original computation Vs. Each aye informs the decision-makers
of his/her
Ws(A
∗) := Vs(A
∗) + 1
and each nays informs of the decision-makers of his/her
Ws(A
∗) := Vs(A
∗).
They share their results among only the decision-makers.
Step 4. The decision-makers compute
r∑
s=1
Ws(A
∗) +
∑
k∈Ec
u′k(A)uk(A).
The election commission reveals (pA
∗
(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2)) to the
public and, at the same time, the decision-makers reveal their final result to the
public. They compute the number of the ayes
y =
r∑
s=1
Ws(A
∗) +
∑
k∈Ec
u′k(A)uk(A) − (p
A∗(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2))
8This information can be helpful in a inspection without anonymity and this may make a
community member who is not a member of the election commission nor the decision-makers
more feels that he/she has something to do with the vote.
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and the number of nays
r − y.
Step 5. If there are more than two items in the vote, Repeat Step 3 and
Step 4 for each item.
Inspection with anonymity. A decision-maker can have a fraudulent vote by
adding a number other than 1 or 0 such as a positive integer grater than 1 or a
negative integer in Step 3. The community wants to inspect whether a decision-
maker had had a fraudulent vote and also wants to keep it’s anonymity. The
number of the case of fair vote is 2r since the number of the decision-makers is
r and a decision-maker chooses 1 or 0. They determine a hash function
h : Zr −→ Z.
A fair vote is
(Vs(A
∗))rs=1 + w,
where w ∈ {0, 1}r. The election commission makes a table of hashes of all
possible 2r cases of fair votes9 and informs the public of the table
{h((Vs(A
∗))rs=1 + w) | w ∈ {0, 1}
r} ⊂ Z.
Then the decision-makers compute the hash of the vote
h((Ws(A
∗))rs=1)
and inform the public of this value. The community checks if one of the values
of the table is equals to this value. If there is no match, then a decision-maker
had added a number other than 0, 1, i.e. it was a fraudulent vote.
1.3 A scheme for the unanimity rule which can hide the number of
voters
Let us think about the community, mentioned at the previous section, wants a
decision making of the decision-makers according to the unanimity rule. The
election commission gives a suffrage to each decision-maker. Every time the
community needs a decision making according to the unanimity rule, they hold
a secret ballot. In a secret ballot, the members of the community want to know
whether there is an objector, but it should not be known that who is the objector
except the objector himself/herself.
Here is a scheme for the community. This scheme do not reveal the number of
the objectors and the number of the decision-makers. In addition, it is possible
that the objectors reveal and prove their disagreement without a help of the
election commission or the other decision-makers if they want to do that.
9It is reasonable if r is not too large. In Korea now(2016), the number of members of a
standing committee(decision-makers) does not exceed 31 and the average is about 22 except
Special Committee on Budget and Accounts(50 members).
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Setting. For decision-makers of r members, the decision-makers meet in
person and does not reveal any information unless specifically noted. the election
commission does not contains a decision-maker and also does not reveal any
information unless specifically noted. The communication between the election
commission and the decision-makers is opened to the public. They do not reveal
the number r of the decision-makers.
Step 1. Same with Step 1 in Section 1.2.
Step 2. Same with Step 2 in Section 1.2.
Step 3. In a secret ballot, the election commission and the decision-makers
chooses randomly a large base set A∗. The election commission computes
(pA
∗
(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2))
and the undistributed terms in the base set A∗. Each decision-maker computes
the combination of partition numbers, which they received, in the base set
A∗. If a decision-maker want to express his/her disagreement, he/she changes
randomly his/her result so that it is different from before. Each decision-maker
shares his/her result among the decision-makers.
Step 4. The election commission informs the public of the values of unre-
vealed terms. The decision-makers combine the shared values with the values of
unrevealed terms. The election commission reveals (pA
∗
(n1)−p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)−
pA
∗
α (n2)) to the public and, at the same time, the decision-makers reveal their
final result to the public. They check if the two values are equal.
Step 5. Repeat Step 3 and Step 4 for several times.
Step 6. If the all tests for several base sets passed, the community judges
that the decision-makers made an unanimous agreement in this vote. If they
failed in a process, the community judges that a decision-maker had disagreed
in this vote.10
If one wants to know who was disagreed, he/she should know both each
decision-maker’s result and the terms each decision-maker received in Step 2.
It is possible only when one of the election commission or the decision-makers
leaked his/her secret so that someone knows the informations from both of them.
If decision-makers who had disagreed in a vote want to reveal their dis-
agreements to the public, they gather all objectors in the vote and reveal each
objector’s original value and the other decision-maker’s values they computed
in Step 3. Then the public can compute the final value and check if it equals to
(pA
∗
(n1)− p
A∗
α (n1))(p
A∗(n2)− p
A∗
α (n2)). It proves their disagreements. It may
be useful if the objectors encounter some disadvantages due to their disagree-
ments. After the disagreement of them is proved, a judicial authority of the
community investigates the election commission and the other decision-makers.
10If two or more decision-maker changes randomly his/her result, it is possible that the final
value still remains same with (pA
∗
(n1)− pA
∗
α (n1))(p
A∗ (n2)− pA
∗
α (n2)).
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2 Partition number Identities
2.1 A partition number
Let A be a subset of the set of natural numbers. We define a partition number
pAα (n)
by the number of partitions of n into elements of A such that the number of
equal parts is less than or equals to α. If there is no restriction of the number
of equal parts, We denote by
pA(n).
2.2 A solution set
Let n and α be natural numbers. We consider all representations of n by
combinations of powers of the α, i.e. all solutions of the equation
n =
∑
i≥1
Niα
i.
For example, n can be represented as following
n = an11 + 2a
n
12 + 4a
n
13 + · · · = a
n
21 + 2a
n
22 + 4a
n
23 + · · · = · · · .
Now, we gather all solutions and make the solution matrix
(an,αij ).
2.3 Partition number identities
Let A be a subset of the set of natural numbers. Let (an,αij ) be the solution
matrix of n =
∑
i≥0(α+ 1)
iNi. Let n and α be natural numbers. Then
pA(n) =
∑
i≥1
∏
j≥1
pAα (a
n,α
ij )
for all A.
2.4 Examples
We show that an identity for n = 10, α = 1 holds for three different base sets
pA(10)
= pA1 (1)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (2) + p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (3)
+pA1 (5) + p
A
1 (2)p
A
1 (2)p
A
1 (1)
+pA1 (2)p
A
1 (4) + p
A
1 (2)p
A
1 (1)
+pA1 (2)p
A
1 (2) + p
A
1 (4)p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (1)
+pA1 (4)p
A
1 (3) + p
A
1 (6)p
A
1 (2) + p
A
1 (6)p
A
1 (1)
+pA1 (8)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (10).
8
Now, we check the identity for three sets of parts.
1) A = {p | p is a prime}.
Let us calculate partition numbers.
10 = 5 + 5
3 + 2 + 5
3 + 3 + 2 + 2
7 + 3
2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2
,
pA1 (1) = 0 p
A
1 (5) = 2
pA1 (2) = 1 p
A
1 (6) = 0
pA1 (3) = 1 p
A
1 (8) = 1
pA1 (4) = 0 p
A
1 (10) = 2.
So, pA(10) = 5. Since pA1 (1) = p
A
1 (4) = p
A
1 (6) = 0,
pA(10) = pA1 (5) + p
A
1 (2)p
A
1 (2) + p
A
1 (10) = 2 + 1 + 2 = 5.
2) A = {n2}.
Let us calculate the partition numbers.
10 = 1 + 9
1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
4 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
4 + 4 + 1 + 1
,
pA1 (1) = 1 p
A
1 (5) = 1
pA1 (2) = 0 p
A
1 (6) = 0
pA1 (3) = 0 p
A
1 (8) = 0
pA1 (4) = 1 p
A
1 (10) = 1.
So, pA(10) = 4. Since pA1 (2) = p
A
1 (3) = p
A
1 (6) = p
A
1 (8) = 0,
pA(10) = pA1 (1)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (5) + p
A
1 (4)p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (10)
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 4.
3) A = {n | n is an odd number}.
Let us calculate the partition numbers.
10 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
3 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
7 + 1 + 1 + 1
9 + 1
3 + 3 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1
3 + 3 + 3 + 1
5 + 5
7 + 3
3 + 5 + 1 + 1
,
pA1 (1) = 1 p
A
1 (5) = 1
pA1 (2) = 0 p
A
1 (6) = 1
pA1 (3) = 1 p
A
1 (8) = 2
pA1 (4) = 1 p
A
1 (10) = 2.
So, pA(10) = 10. Since pA1 (2) = 0,
pA(10) = pA1 (1)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (3) + p
A
1 (5)
+pA1 (4)p
A
1 (1)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (4)p
A
1 (3)
+pA1 (6)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (8)p
A
1 (1) + p
A
1 (10)
= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2
= 10.
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3 Closing remarks
A r-person authentication can be performed by using an existing authentication
scheme which based on difficult problem such as integer factoring or discrete
logarithm or based on elliptic curves. But these problems studied for many years
and some effective methods for the problems are known. For example, Pollard-
Strassen prime factorization[1], method Especially, it is known that there are
polynomial-time algorithms for a quantum computer solving integer factoring
and discrete logarithm[3]. However, it seems difficult that one compute u, v
from the values of pA
∗
α (u)p
A∗
α (v) for some base sets A
∗.
To use the schemes in practice, the method to choose proper n1, n2, α and
A∗ should be invented in consideration of computing ability at that moment.
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